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PROPERTY LAW-MORTGAGES-VALIDITY OF DUE-ON-SALE
CLAUSES IN INSTRUMENTS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED SAVINGS
AND LOANS UPHELD. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
Appellant, a California federal savings and loan association
chartered by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, executed deeds
of trust to secure certain real estate loans. Each of these instruments
contained a "due-on-sale" clause which provided that if the mort-
gaged property were sold without the prior consent of the lender, the
principal and interest would automatically become due and paya-
ble.' The appellees were individuals who had purchased these
properties from the mortgagors without the prior consent of the ap-
pellant. After learning of the conveyances, the appellant expressed
a willingness to allow the transfers, but only if the appellees agreed
to an increase in the mortgage interest rates to reflect current market
rates, a common practice in the industry. When the appellees re-
fused to agree to this condition, the appellant accelerated the loans
and began non-judicial foreclosures of the mortgaged properties.
The appellees sought injunctive and declaratory relief in the
Superior Court of Orange County. The appellees contended that
the California Supreme Court decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America2 precluded the appellant from exercising the due-on-sale
clauses unless it could demonstrate that the transfers would impair
the lender's security or otherwise increase the risk of default. The
Superior Court consolidated the cases and granted the appellant's
motion for summary judgment holding that federal savings and
loan associations are regulated by the federal government and,
therefore, Wellenkamp was not controlling. The California Court of
Appeals reversed, however, stating that Congress had not expressed
the requisite intent to preempt state law concerning due-on-sale
clauses and that mortgage and real property law had traditionally
1. An example of a typical due-on-sale clause is as follows: "Upon the sale or transfer
of the premises described herein, or any part thereof, the whole of said principal sum and
the interest thereon shall, at the option of the Mortgagee, become immediately due and
payable." 8A. J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, CURRENT LEOAL FORMS § 21.70 (1982).
2. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) (required a demonstration by
the lender that his security had been impaired by the transfer before allowing enforcement
of due-on-sale clauses).
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been controlled by state law.3 The United States Supreme Court
reversed the decision of the California Court of Appeals, holding
that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulation preempted
state law in this area and that due-on-sale clauses could be acceler-
ated at will by federally chartered savings and loan associations. Fi-
delity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta, 102 S. Ct.
3014 (1982).
Although the due-on-sale clause has been widely used only in
the last twenty years, early cases upheld other devices giving the
grantor the power to restrict future use and alienation of the prop-
erty.4 Restrictive clauses in mortgages which provided for the accel-
eration of principal and interest if the property ceased to be used for
particular purposes,5 and acceleration clauses activated by the mort-
gagor's failure to pay any installments, taxes, or assessments against
the property6 have generally been held to be valid restraints on
alienation. Nevertheless, even during this early period, the courts
were not unyielding to the demands of equity when the mortgagor's
default could be excused in the eyes of the court.7
3. de la Cuesta v. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 Cal. App. 3d 328, 175 Cal.
Rptr. 467 (1981).
4. One of the earliest restraints took the form of an oath requiring the grantees of the
Abbott of Gloucester not to sell, mortgage, or otherwise transfer the property to any other
"religious house without the consent of the monks." Bonanno, Due on Sale and Prepayment
Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times of Fluctuating Interest Rates-Legal
Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F.L. REV. 267, 271 n.l 1 (1972). Another form of restraint
exercised by the grantor has been the right of re-entry for the breach of a condition subse-
quent, a restraint generally upheld by the courts. 4 G.W. THOMPSON, THOMPSON ON REAL
PROPERTY § 1979, at 388 (1979).
5. In Board of Church Erection Fund v. First Presbyterian Church, 19 Wash. 455, 53
P. 671 (1898), the Washington Supreme Court upheld the validity of an acceleration clause
contingent upon the failure to use the mortgaged property as a "house of worship" and
rejected the mortgagor's contention that the clause was a restraint on alienation and based
upon religious beliefs.
In a suit to enforce a materialman's lien on a church building, the Mississippi Supreme
Court interpreted another acceleration clause similar to that in First Presbyterian Church.
Planters' Lumber Co. v. Griffin Chapel M.E. Church, 157 Miss. 714, 128 So. 76 (1930).
6. The mortgagor in Lewis v. Culbertson, 124 Conn. 333, 199 A. 642 (1938), failed to
pay an insurance premium. Under a state statute incorporated into the mortgage agreement,
the mortgagee had the right of reimbursement for any payment he made to protect his se-
cured interests. Although this clause did not explicitly give the mortgagee the right to auto-
matic foreclosure upon the payment of the premium, the court allowed foreclosure after the
mortgagor failed to reimburse the mortgagee for such payments.
7. Construing an early example of a due-on-sale clause, the Iowa court relieved the
mortgagor of the burdensome clause by basing its decision on mutual mistake. Merriam v.
Leeper, 192 Iowa 587, 185 N.W. 134 (1921). "It is a general rule in equity that a party to a
written contract may not escape the obligations thereof by merely showing that he failed to
read the same," but he can be relieved if he can show his failure to read was due to "some
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Initially, the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of
the due-on-sale clause, finding that the clause was a reasonable re-
straint upon alienation.' Likewise, the California Court of Appeals
expressed its view that these types of clauses were valid exercises of
contractual power which are necessary to protect the lender's secur-
ity.9 Then, in La Sala v. American Savings and Loan Association,"°
the California Supreme Court refused to allow the automatic en-
forcement of a due-on-encumbrance clause. Similar to the due-on-
sale clause, this restriction would accelerate the principal and inter-
est if the mortgagor executed a junior mortgage on the secured
property. Explaining that automatic enforcement of the clause
would be an unreasonable restraint on alienation, the court held
that the lender could enforce a due-on-encumbrance clause only if it
were reasonably necessary to protect the mortgagee's security. 1
However, the court stated that the decision did not affect the validity
of the due-on-sale clause stating that such clauses were enforceable
provisions. 12 Finally, the California Supreme Court in Tucker v.
Lassen Savings and Loan Association 3 applied the rationale of La
Sala and held that a due-on-sale clause could not be enforced auto-
matically after the mortgagor entered into an installment contract
for the sale of the property. In the court's view, the due-on-sale
artifice or fraudulent connivance instrumental in such prevention." Id at 593, 185 N.W. at
137. The court emphasized the circumstances surrounding the execution of the mortgage
and noted the hint of possible fraudulent inducement by the mortgagee's agent.
8. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
9. Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138-39
(1969). Most notable was the court's observation that the clause did not prevent the sale of
the property, but only provided the option to accelerate upon the purchaser's refusal to
accept a higher interest rate. In the court's view, "[s]uch refusal [by the mortgagee to accept
the new purchaser without an interest rate increase) demonstrated no lack of good faith or
fair dealing," and "[nleither [the mortgagor nor the new purchasers], all of whom were
aware of the terms, can complain." Id
10. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
11. Id at 881, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
12. The court distinguished a due-on-sale clause by noting the effect of a sale of the
property as opposed to executing a junior mortgage.
A sale of the property usually divests the vendor of any interest in that property,
and involves the transfer of possession, with responsibility for maintenance and
upkeep, to the vendee. A junior encumbrance, on the other hand, does not termi-
nate the borrower's interests in the property, and rarely involves a transfer of
possession.
Id at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. The court also noted that the operation of
a due-on-sale clause would not seriously impair the right of alienation since "the sale terms
can, and usually will, provide for payment of the prior trust deed." Id at 880 n. 17, 489 P.2d
at 1123 n.17, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859 n.17.
13. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
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clause in this instance would be an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion, and although the mortgagor would no longer have possession,
the potential "dangers of waste and depreciation" did not "justify
the blanket restraint on alienation."' 4 Only upon a demonstration
that the conveyance created "a threat to one of [the lender's] legiti-
mate interests" could enforcement be justified.'-' This decision con-
trolled until 1978, when the California Supreme Court decided
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America. 6 In Wellenkamp, the court clari-
fied its position that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon an
"outright" sale could be activated only upon a showing of impair-
ment of security or an increase in the risk of default. 7
Sensing possible financial problems for federal savings and
loan associations in states like California where due-on-sale clauses
were not automatically enforceable,'" the Federal Home Loan Bank
14. Id at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638 (emphasis in original).
15. Id at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
16. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
17. Id at 948-51, 582 P.2d at 973-75, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 382-84. The court noted that its
earlier decisions of La Sala v. American Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113,
97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971), and Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d
1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974), were based upon the reasoning that the restraint on aliena-
tion of an acceleration upon an outright sale would be minimal. However, the court's use of
the term "outright sale" had been used only to include sales when the mortgagor would
receive full payment from the new purchaser. As the court pointed out, however, this situa-
tion is often not the case as the high cost of new financing may effectively prevent the buyer
from substituting a new loan for the one being accelerated. By preventing the new buyer
from buying the mortgagor's equity and assuming the old loan, the mortgagee is placing an
unreasonable restraint on alienation. Therefore, the court expanded its definition of out-
right sale to include any transfer by sale of the legal title.
18. Basically, the decisions of various state courts fall into three categories. One group
requires impairment of security and/or an increased risk of default before the loan can be
accelerated. These states seem to reflect the minority viewpoint. Patton v. First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 118 Ariz. 473, 578 P.2d 152 (1978); Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582
P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978); Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich.
App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977); State ex rel Bingaman v. Valley Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 97
N.M. 8, 636 P.2d 279 (1981); Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87
Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
The second category consists of those states allowing automatic enforcement. Provident
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Realty Centre, Ltd., 101 Ill. App. 3d 277, 428 N.E.2d 170 (1981);
Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967); Dunham v. Ware Sav. Bank, 423 N.E.2d
998 (Mass. 1981); Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 308 N.W.2d 471
(Minn. 1981); First Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976);
Century Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558 (1976);
Ceravolo v. Buckner, I11 Misc. 2d 676, 444 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1981); People's Sav. Ass'n v.
Standard Indus., Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 406 (1970); Ministers & Missionaries
Benefit Bd. of the Am. Baptist Churches v. Goldsworthy, 253 Pa. Super. 321, 385 A.2d 358
(1978); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973); Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Sav.
Ass'n, 615 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. Neilson, 26 Utah
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Board promulgated regulations that allowed member institutions to
include due-on-sale clauses in their loan instruments.' 9 Noting that
the majority of state court decisions had upheld the validity of the
clauses, the Board viewed such action as necessary to secure the
financial stability of federal savings and loan associations.20
After the adoption of these regulations, various suits followed
in which federal savings and loan associations sought to establish
the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses in their mortgage instru-
ments. In Glendale Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Fox2 the
United States District Court for the Central District of California
found a clear congressional intent to preempt state regulation of the
operation of federal savings and loan associations. The court recog-
nized that the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA)22 author-
ized the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to promulgate those
regulations necessary to insure the safe and stable operation of fed-
eral savings and loans23 and that the regulation of due-on-sale
2d 383, 490 P.2d 328 (1971); Mutual Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wisconsin Wire Works, 71
Wis. 2d 531, 239 N.W.2d 20 (1976).
The third category contains those states which allow automatic enforcement but specifi-
cally note that equity may intervene when the acceleration clause would be unconscionable
or inequitable. Tierce, II v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979); Malouff v. Midland Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Occidental Sav. & Loan Ass'n v.
Venco Partnership, 206 Neb. 469, 293 N.W.2d 843 (1980); Mills v. Nashua Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 121 N.H. 722, 433 A.2d 1312 (1981); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289
N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Continental Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d
1013 (Okla. 1977).
19. Adopted in 1976, the regulation noted that:
An association continues to have the power to include, as a matter of contract
between it and the borrower, a provision in its loan instrument whereby the associ-
ation may, at its option, declare immediately due and payable sums secured by the
association's security instrument if all or any part of the real property securing the
loan is sold or transferred by the borrower without the association's prior written
consent.
12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f) (1982).
20. 41 Fed. Reg. 6283, 6285 (1976). The Board outlined four reasons why its decision
was necessary. 1) The financial stability of member institutions would be jeopardized by the
assumption of the loan by the new purchaser, 2) Eliminating the due-on-sale clause would
substantially reduce cash flow and net income of member institutions; 3) The sale of the
association's home loans on the secondary market would be severely hampered without the
clause; 4) Prohibiting the use of the clause would cause "economic hardship" on the major-
ity of home sellers while benefiting only a small number. Id
21. 459 F. Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
22. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
23. The purpose of HOLA as stated by Congress is:
In order to provide local mutual thrift institutions in which people may invest their
funds and in order to provide for the financing of homes, the Board is authorized,
under such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, to provide for the organiza-
tion, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of associations to be
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clauses in instruments of federal savings and loans was entirely
within the regulatory power of the Board.24 Other federal court de-
cisions that followed Glendale reached essentially the same
conclusion. 25
Although it did not have an opportunity to decide the validity
of the due-on-sale clause until 1972,26 the Arkansas Supreme Court
generally sustained the validity of acceleration clauses contingent
upon the mortgagor's failure to pay an installment, tax, or insurance
payment.2 7 Yet, in Johnson v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. ,28 the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court, while sustaining an acceleration clause,
noted that equity would shield the mortgagor from the harsh effects
of an acceleration clause in those instances in which the mortgagee's
conduct would render enforcement of the clause inequitable.29
known as "Federal Savings and Loan Associations," and to issue charters therefor,
giving primary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home
financing institutions in the United States.
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)(1) (1976).
24. The court in Glendale stated:
The language, history, structure and purpose of the Home Owner's Loan Act evi-
dence a clear Congressional intent to delegate to the Bank Board complete author-
ity to regulate federal savings and loan associations and to preempt state
regulation. Whenever the Bank Board pursuant to that plenary authority, promul-
gates a regulation governing an aspect of the operation of federal savings and loan
associations, that regulation governs exclusively and preempts any attempt by a
state to regulate in that area.
Glendale Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F. Supp. 903, 910 (C.D. Cal. 1978).
25. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Myrick, 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Ark.
1982); Price v. Florida Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n, 524 F. Supp. 175 (M.D. Fla. 1981); First
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Peterson, 516 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Fla. 1981); Conference of Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp. 12 (E.D. Cal. 1979); Bailey v. First Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 1139 (C.D. IUI. 1979).
However, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Williams v. First Fed. Say. and Loan
Ass'n, 651 F.2d 910 (4th Cir. 1981), avoided the preemption question by holding that due-
on-sale clauses were valid restraints on alienation. The court noted the possible preemption
of any state law regulating the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses in instruments of federal
savings and loan institutions. Choosing to avoid the preemption question, the court held
that due-on-sale clauses do not contravene Virginia law. Barring any inequitable circum-
stances which would render the clause unenforceable, the court believed that lenders should
be able to rely on the clause and stated that "[tlhere is nothing inherently unfair or unrea-
sonable in such a rule." Id at 927.
26. Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
27. Hume v. Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co., 155 Ark. 466, 245 S.W. 19 (1922) (court upheld
an acceleration clause contingent on the failure of the mortgagor to pay taxes on the prop-
erty); Mooney v. Tyler, 68 Ark. 314, 57 S.W. 1105 (1900) (an acceleration clause contingent
on the mortgagor's failure to make an insurance payment was upheld); Farnsworth v. Hoo-
ver, 66 Ark. 367, 50 S.W. 865 (1899) (court upheld on acceleration clause contingent on the
mortgagor's failure to pay an interest installment).
28. 177 Ark. 770, 9 S.W.2d 3 (1928).
29. Id at 773, 9 S.W.2d at 5. The court upheld a provision for acceleration of the debt
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These decisions controlled until 1972 when the Arkansas Supreme
Court decided Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan Associa-
tion .30 In dealing with the due-on-sale clause for the first time, the
court held that a clause which provided for acceleration of the prin-
cipal and interest upon the sale of the property could not be exer-
cised unless there existed "legitimate grounds for refusal to accept a
transfer to a particular individual or concern."' 3' While the court
clearly prohibited arbitrary enforcement, the basis for the court's de-
cision in Tucker is not clear.32 The court failed to specify what con-
stituted "legitimate grounds" for acceleration, although it seemed to
emphasize the mortgagee's failure to demonstrate impairment of se-
curity.33 The validity of the Tucker decision, however, was cast in
doubt by First Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Myrick .3  This
decision by the United States District Court for the Western District
of Arkansas followed the rationale of earlier federal court decisions
upon the failure of the mortgagor to pay any note, interest installment, taxes or special
assessments. However, the court did specify certain equitable grounds upon which it could
relief the mortgagor: if the acceleration clause is waived by the mortgagee; if the mortga-
gor's default is the result of accident or mistake; or if the acceleration clause is procured by
fraud or some other inequitable conduct of the lender.
In Harrell v. Perkins, 216 Ark. 579, 226 S.W.2d 803 (1950), the court barred the enforce-
ment of the acceleration clause basing its decision upon the equitable powers of the court.
Concluding that the actions of the mortgagee had caused the mortgagor's default, the court
held that the acceleration would be unconscionable. Similarly, the court later ruled that an
acceleration upon a 48-hour delay in payment would be an inequitable acceleration. See the
supplemental opinion in Seay v. Davis, 246 Ark. 201, 438 S.W.2d 479, reh'gdenied, 246 Ark.
627, 438 S.W.2d 479 (1969).
30. 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972).
31. Id at 855, 481 S.W.2d at 729. Specifically, the court noted the reasoning in Balti-
more Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190 (1971), and quoted extensively
from it:
Absent an allegation that the purpose of the clause is in some respect being circum-
vented or that the mortgagee's security is jeopardized, a plaintiff cannot be entitled
to equitable relief. Otherwise the equitable powers of the trial court would be
invoked to impose an extreme penalty on a mortgagor with no showing that he has
violated the substance of the agreement, that is, that he would not make a convey-
ance that would impair the security.
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 854, 481 S.W.2d 725, 729 (1972)
(quoting Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190, 193 (1971)).
32. As one commentator noted, "it is not altogether clear whether the court was basing
its decision upon the requirement that restraints be reasonable or upon its equitable powers
to deny foreclosure .. " Finch, Due-On-Sale Clauses in Debt Instruments.- Reconciling Le-
gal Doctrine and Market Realities, 98 BANKING L.J. 300, 304 (1981).
33. In quoting from Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, the court emphasized the language
used by the Arizona court that "[a]t no place in the pleading does an allegation appear that
the plaintiffs security is in any way jeopardized." 252 Ark. at 855, 481 S.W.2d at 729 (quot-
ing Baltimore Life Ins. Co. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d 190, 193 (1971)).
34. 533 F. Supp. 1041 (W.D. Ark. 1982).
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and held that due-on-sale clauses were enforceable by Arkansas fed-
eral savings and loan institutions.
The United States Supreme Court in Fidelity Federal Savings
and Loan Association v. de la Cuesta35 settled the question whether
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulations permitting feder-
ally-chartered savings and loan institutions to enforce due-on-sale
clauses preempted state law in the area. The Court recognized that
federal preemption may be evidenced by an express statement of
congressional intent to preempt state law, or it may be implied when
the regulatory scheme reasonably precludes any supplemental ac-
tion by the states.36 Preemptive intent can also be found if state law
directly opposes the intended congressional purposes or otherwise
conflicts with federal law.37 The Court also noted that federal regu-
lations have the same preemptive effect as federal law if the regula-
tions are reasonably promulgated and are consistent with the
authorizing statute.3 8 To afford the regulation allowing due-on-sale
clauses preemptive status the Court had to determine whether the
regulation was within the scope of the authorizing statute, the Home
Owners' Loan Act of 1933 (HOLA).39 The Court noted that HOLA
was a response by Congress to the unstable banking conditions cre-
ated by the great depression and was enacted to provide stable and
secure savings institutions.4° The congressional intent was to pre-
scribe regulations which reflected "accepted" and "sound" banking
practices for the savings institutions and not merely an adoption of
local practices.4 In short, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board was
not bound by state law.42 The Board's desire that enforcement of
the clauses be governed by federal law is stated clearly in the regula-
tion,43 and the Court held that federal savings and loan associations
are authorized to enforce the clauses without a showing of impair-
35. 102 S. Ct. 3014 (1982).
36. Id at 3022.
37. Id
38. Id at 3022-23.
39. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1470 (1976 & Supp. IV 19 80).
40. 102 S. Ct. at 3025-26.
41. IT]he Board is authorized, under such rules and regulations as it may pre-
scribe, to provide for the organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and
regulation of associations to be known as 'Federal Savings and Loan Associations'
or 'Federal mutual savings banks' . . ., and to issue charters therefor, giving pri-
mary consideration to the best practices of local mutual thrift and home-financing
institutions in the United States.
Id at 3026 (quoting § 5(a) of HOLA) (emphasis in original).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 3024-25.
43. "Due-on-sale practices of Federal associations shall be governed exclusively by the
[Vol. 5:569
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ment of security, a requirement of the Wellenkamp doctrine."
The question unresolved by Fidelity Federal is whether states
may continue to restrict enforcement of due-on-sale clauses by
mortgagees other than federally chartered savings and loan institu-
tions. Even though Fidelity Federal was limited to the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board's regulations, the decision could apply to
similar regulations promulgated by other federal banking authori-
ties.45 Subject only to the limits of the agency's authorizing stat-
ute,46 the regulations of these other federal banking authorities
could very well preempt state law governing due-on-sale clauses.
The question also remains whether Fidelity Federal will have
Board's regulations in preemption of and without regard to any limitations imposed by state
law on either their inlusion [sic] or exercise. 12 C.F.R. § 556.9(f)(2) (1982).
44. 102 S. Ct. at 3030-31.
45. The banking industry is a virtual labyrinth of intertwining federal and state regula-
tory and statutory controls. Banks and savings and loans can choose to be either federally or
state chartered. State-chartered institutions can come under federal regulatory authority by
electing to insure their assets under the Federal Depository Insurance Corporation or the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. The overall perspective is complicated
further by the election of state banks to become members of the Federal Reserve System,
thus subjecting themselves to the regulatory authority of the Board of Governors. In short,
"[t]he dual banking system ...is not a simplistic system of supervision by two separate
authorities; it is a system in which federal regulation operates side by side with state regula-
tion." I W. SCHLICHTING, T. RICE & J. COOPER, BANKING LAW § 2.03 (1982).
The Comptroller of the Currency, the regulatory authority which controls national
banks, is currently considering a proposed regulation allowing the inclusion and enforce-
ment of due-on-sale clauses in instruments of national banks. 47 Fed. Reg. 18476 (1982).
The Comptroller has also drafted a proposed regulation allowing a national bank to prohibit
assumption of an outstanding loan by a new purchaser. 47 Fed. Reg. 23944, 23948 (1982)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.6). This regulation expressly provides for preemption of
state law.
The staff of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is also planning to
revise its official commentary to Regulation Z (Truth in Lending) "to clarify that a due-on-
sale clause is not considered a demand feature requiring disclosure." 47 Fed. Reg. 20603,
20606 (1982).
The National Credit Union Administration has also amended its regulations to require
federal credit unions to include due-on-sale clauses in their long-term mortgage instruments.
12 C.F.R. § 701.21-6(d) (1982).
Subsequent to the Fidelity Federal decision, Congress passed the Garn-St. Germaine
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982), which an-
swered many of the questions posed in the text. In short, the act allows the enforcement of a
"due-on-sale" clause by the "lender," defining "lender" as "a person or government agency
making a real property loan or any assignee or transferee, in whole or in part, of such a
person or agency." Pub. L. 97-320, § 341(a)(2), 96 Stat. at 1505.
46. The purposes and objectives of HOLA, supra note 23, played a key role in the
Court's decision. Under the authority of HOLA, the Board's concern is that of insuring the
continued and stable financial operations of federal savings and loans. The authorizing stat-
utes of other federal banking authorities face the same careful review to determine whether
their regulatory measures have the same preemptive effect over state law.
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any effect on the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses by state
chartered institutions. Unless subject to the control of a federal
banking authority governed by Fidelity Federal, the decision would
not prevent the continued application of Tucker to Arkansas' state
chartered institutions. This imbalance would create an obvious eco-
nomic advantage in favor of federally chartered counterparts and
could be viewed as an incentive for state institutions to obtain a
federal charter.47 Additional relief exists for Arkansas institutions
since state statutes allow the state agencies which regulate state
banks and savings and loans to confer "business practices" enjoyed
by federal institutions upon state chartered institutions.48
Looking beyond the enforcement questions presented by Fidel-
ity Federal, one must consider the possible effects of the decision on
the real estate market served by lending institutions. While an argu-
ment exists that preventing the assumption of low interest loans by
home buyers could have a serious effect on the already depressed
real estate market,49 lending institutions are quick to point out detri-
mental consequences on home financing caused by the inability of
lenders to enforce due-on-sale clauses.50 For the most part, the wis-
47. Specifically, 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and 12 C.F.R. § 543.9
(1982) outline the procedure for the conversion of state savings and loans into federal insti-
tutions. Under 12 U.S.C. § 35 (1976), state banks can convert into a national banking
association.
48. Under Arkansas law, the Savings and Loan Associatiol Board has the power to
allow state-chartered institutions to "[aidopt any business practice, procedure, method of
system authorized for a Federal Association doing business in this State." ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 67-1858 (1980). Similarly, the State Bank Commissioner, with the approval of the State
Banking Board, can "authorize state banks to engage in any banking activities in which said
banks could engage were they acting as national banks at the time sLch authority is
granted." ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-501.1(o) (1980). The Arkansas State Savings and Loan
Association Board did adopt regulations allowing state savings and loan associetions to offer
any form of mortgage which is authorized for federal associations. These regulations were
used as the basis of the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Schulte v. Benton Savings and
Loan Association, No. 83-74 (Ark. May 31, 1983), which held that state savings and loan
associations were no longer bound by Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 252
Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725 (1972) and that state associations could enforce the due-on-sale
clause without a showing of impairment of security.
49. Many individuals in the real estate industry view the Fidelity Federal decision as a
further burden on the real estate market. Since some home buyers are unable to afford the
current market rates, real estate sales will decline and/or the seller will be forced to reduce
his asking price to accommodate the new buyer who is unable to assume the seller's mort-
gage. Andrew, Assumable-Mortgages Ruling Seen Further Hurting Market, Wall St. J., June
30, 1982, at 25, col. 1.
50. As one author points out, the detrimental effects of the inability to maintain mort-
gages at current market rates outweigh any benefit received by the few home buyers who
assume low interest mortgages. The increased costs to the lender, created by rising interest
rates and the assumption of low interest mortgages by buyers, can pose a severe reduction in
NOTES
dom of the Board's regulation is yet to be seen, and as the Fidelity
Federal decision indicates, any change in the due-on-sale regula-
tions must come not from the courts but from the agency itself. Yet,
in light of the Board's express purpose and primary interest in pro-
tecting the interests and security of member institutions, any move
in that direction by the Board may be slow in coming.
David G. Paul
the lender's return on real estate investments. This reduction in the lender's return would
also result in lower rates offered depositors by lending institutions. In addition, new borrow-
ers who are unable to assume existing mortgages will find increased interest rates as lenders
attempt to recover lost profits from low interest mortgages. Yet another adverse effect on
borrowers could be the replacement of long term loans with loans amortized over periods of
less than ten years, a measure which will find some borrowers unable to pay the increased
monthly payments. Finch, Due-On-Sale Clauses in Debt Instruments.- Reconciling Legal
Doctrine and Market Realities, 98 BANKING L.J. 300, 338-40 (1981).
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